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LAND USE-Goffinet v. County of Christian: New
Flexibility in Illinois Zoning Law
INTRODUCTION

In Goffinet v. County of Christian,I the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that conditional rezoning is not invalid per se. The decision
finally resolves the uncertainty which has existed in Illinois zoning
law2 since statements by the supreme court in dicta fourteen years
ago.3 On its face, the decision provides Illinois zoning authorities
with an alternative to strict Euclidean zoning.' In practice, the usefulness of conditional rezoning as a land use control will depend on
the ability of local government to impose conditions consistent with
traditional zoning guidelines.This article will discuss the problem of conditional rezoning: the
definitional ambiguity, the objections which have been raised, and
the suggested alternatives. The Goffinet case will be examined in
light of its impact on Illinois law and in comparison with solutions
offered by other jurisdictions. Finally, this article will propose
guidelines for the proper implementation of conditional rezoning in
Illinois after Goffinet.
CONDITIONAL REZONING:

A

BRIEF ANALYSIS

Clarifying the DefinitionalAmbiguity
There has been little attempt by courts to define with any precision what is meant by the term "conditional rezoning." Much of the
difficulty in this area of land use law stems from the failure of courts
to distinguish "conditional rezoning" from "contract zoning. '"I Contract zoning, properly understood, describes a situation in which a
1. 65 IlI. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
2. For a discussion of the law of conditional rezoning in Illinois prior to Goffinet, see
Stefaniak, The Status of ConditionalRezoning in Illinois-An Argument to Sustain a Flexible Zoning Tool, 63 ILL. B.J. 132 (1974).
3. See Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (1962).
4. The term is derived from the landmark zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926). Euclidean zoning involves the division of land within a jurisdiction into
districts, each district having only a limited number of permissible uses. See generally 1 R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 8.14, 8.15, 8.17 (1st ed. 1968).
5. See text accompanying notes 101-102 infra.
6. See Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Shapiro]; Schaffer, Contract Zoning and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning
Flexibility, 11 PRAc. LAW. No. 5, 43 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Schaffer]; Note, Contract
and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 825 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Contract and Conditional Zoning].
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property owner and a local governmental unit undertake reciprocal
obligations with respect to a zoning ordinance amendment.' The
property owner gives the governmental unit an enforceable promise
to perform some act as consideration for a requested zoning change.
The act may or may not be related to the intended property use but
it is always one not otherwise required by the applicable zoning
ordinance. The owner's promise may be to restrict the use of the
property to only one of the allowable uses,' make certain improvements to the property,' dedicate a portion of the land to the local
government,' 0 or donate a sum of money to the municipality or
county.I
In return, the governmental zoning authority binds itself in contract to rezone the property. 2 The zoning authority may also agree
that the applicable zoning or building code will remain unchanged
for a specified period of time. 3 The most identifiable characteristic
of contract zoning is the exercise of the zoning power pursuant to
an express bilateral agreement between the landowner and the zoning authority.
In a conditional rezoning case, a governmental body obtains the
property owner's commitment to subject the property to certain
regulations as a condition precedent to the approval of the rezoning
petition.'4 The key here is the absense of any agreement to rezone
the subject property by the governmental body. The owner's commitment may be exacted at any time before or after the enactment
of the rezoning ordinance. 5 Regulations which condition the rezoning amendment assume a variety of forms. Typical are conditions
which relate to recorded deed restrictions limiting use" or require7. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.21 (lst ed. 1968); D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 94 (2d ed. 1971); 1 N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN PLANNING LAW, LAND USE, AND THE POUCE POWER § 29.01 (1974).
8. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
9. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
10. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
11. Andres v. Village of Flossmoor, 15 I1. App. 3d 655, 304 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
12. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319
(1952).
13. Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40
(1961).
14. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 270-71.
15. One commentator suggests that exacting conditions prior to the passage of the zoning
change is different in form, substance, and legal effect from true conditional rezoning. Schaffer, supra note 6, at 43. The usual situation appears to be that the agreement by the property
owner is obtained in advance of the zoning change. See, e.g., State ex rel. Zupancic v.
Schimenz, 46 Wisc. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862,
120 N.W.2d 270 (1963). But see, Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
16. State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wisc. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
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ments for open space and buffer zones. Regardless of the form the
conditions take, or the time at which those conditions are imposed,
all conditional rezoning ordinances share one common element. The
property owner, at the suggestion of the zoning authority or of his
own volition, unilaterally agrees to take some action which may
induce the desired change of zoning classification.
Although it has been persuasively argued that no basic difference
exists between contract and conditional rezoning,'" it is essential
that the two terms be recognized as separate and distinct concepts.
This distinction is critical to the rational explanation of the case law
concerning zoning with conditions.
Criticisms of ConditionalRezoning
Traditionally, the same arguments have been advanced against
both contract zoning and conditional rezoning. This unfortunate
situation results primarily from the failure or inability of courts to
perceive adequately the differences between these two zoning techniques. However, close scrutiny of the major criticism of contract
zoning reveals that the same criticism is inapplicable to conditional
rezoning.
Courts have generally held that contract zoning constitutes an
improper bargaining away of a governmental unit's police power:
"[A] contract made by a zoning authority to zone or rezone or not
to zone is illegal and the ordinance is void because a municipality
may not surrender its governmental powers and functions or thus
inhibit the exercise of its police or legislative powers." 9 This argu17. Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962).
18. See Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
In Scrutton the California Court of Appeals stated: "The phrase contract zoning has no legal
significance and simply refers to a reclassification of land use in which the landowner agrees
to perform conditions not imposed on other land in the same calssification." Id. at 419, 79
Cal. Rptr. at 878. Since the court seems to equate contract with conditional rezoning, the
transaction in Scrutton was sustained despite its contractual nature. See also Trager,
Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REv. 121 (1963), where it is suggested that all conditional rezoning
is contract zoning. The explanation for this approach is that when a municipality passes a
zoning amendment which is within its discretion, it gives consideration for which it may ask
return promises from the person seeking the zoning change. Therefore, a zoning amendment
subject to conditions will constitute "contract zoning." Another commentator maintains that
conditional rezoning is a broad concept, composed of both zoning by bilateral contractual
arrangement and unilateral imposition of controls. See Stefaniak, supra note 2. Others have
taken the position that the line between contract and conditional rezoning might be too
tenuous to be of practical significance. See 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 74-9 (4th ed. 1975).
19. State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wisc. 2d 22, 28, 174 N.W.2d 533, 537 (1970).
Accord, Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 111. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 422 (1976); Bucholz v. City
of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164,

19771

Conditional Rezoning

ment usually assumes two basic forms. First, if a governing body
can legislate by contract, "each citizen would be governed by an
individual rule based upon the best deal he could make with the
governing body. 2 0 This is clearly in derogation of the principle that
the power to zone, which is derived from the police power,' must
be exercised for the benefit of the public health, welfare, and safety,
and not in furtherance of private interests." Second, the bargaining
away of the zoning authority violates the principle that zoning laws
are flexible and must remain subject to change. By entering into a
contract to zone, the governing body has agreed expressly or impliedly that the subject property will remain zoned as provided in
the contract. 3 Such action amounts to a surrender of the power to
govern. An agreement which binds a local government in this manner is clearly void.24
Conditional rezoning, on the other hand, does not involve a bargaining away of legislative power, since there is no commitment by
the governmental unit to rezone. No legislative power has been surrendered by accepting the conditions to the rezoning petition. The
strongest criticism against conditional rezoning in this context is
that the conditions may have "blurred" the legislative judgment to
rezone.2 5 This objection does not warrant a rule which invalidates
conditional rezoning in every case. Nevertheless, there are at least
four objections leveled against conditional rezoning. 6
1.

Lack of Statutory Authority

In general, the most forceful argument against conditional rezoning concerns the lack of express statutory authority to impose conditions on a rezoning amendment.Y Some courts have held the condi148 A.2d 429 (1959). Contra, Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1969); State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
20. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
21. Kennedy v. City of Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932).
22. Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 11. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951).
23. See Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d
40 (1961).
24. See note 19 supra.
25. See Shapiro, supra note 6.
26. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976). A catalogue of
the major and incidental objections to conditional rezoning appears in several cases. See, e.g.,
Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill.
App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1975); Andres v. Village
of Flossmoor, 15 111. App. 3d 655, 304 N.E.2d 700 (1973); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md.
164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
27. The zoning enabling legislation for Illinois municipalities is found in ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 24, § 11-13-1 et seq. (1975) and ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 3151-61 (1975) for counties.
Neither statute provides a zoning authority with the power to impose conditions upon a
request for a zoning change.
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tional rezoning of property ultra vires and void.28 If the power to
conditionally rezone exists at all, it must be implied from other
powers delegated to the zoning authority.
The New York Court of Appeals in Church v. Town of Islip
reached a different result.2 9 In Church, the town board consented to
a change of zone, subject to the condition that the rezoning petitioners conform the property to certain specifications. Since the board
could have rezoned the property without conditions or denied the
petition in its entirety, the court concluded that reclassifying land
with attendant conditions was also within the power vested in the
3
town board. 1
Another approach to conditional rezoning and statutory justification was suggested in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento.31The court
in Scrutton maintained that the state zoning statute merely provided a framework for standardizing local zoning practices, and was
not intended to specifically establish all the forms zoning might
take. The court stated: "The state statutes' silence on conditional
rezoning is not a denial of power to pursue that practice. The practice must find its own justification as an appropriate exercise of the
3' 2
local police power.
This authority to impose conditions on zoning amendments might
be implied from the authority to grant variances 33 or special uses 34
subject to conditions.3 In jurisdictions where the authority to condi28. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
29. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
30. Id. at 255, 168 N.E.2d at 682, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 867. A strong criticism of the case
appears in 1 N. WiwAms, AMmucAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 29.03 (1974).
31. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
32. Id. at 417, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
33. A variance can be defined as a permitted violation of the zoning regulations. Authority
to grant variances is given to municipalities by IL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-4 (1975) and
to counties by IL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3154 (1975). See text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
34. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1.1 (1975) gives municipalities the power to grant
special uses, particular uses established in the zoning ordinance which may be allowed if
certain facts exist. See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
35. See generally Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land Use Control, 67 DIcK. L. REV.
109 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Strine]. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1.1 (1975) expressly
empowers municipalities.to impose conditions on special use permits. Section 7 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act authorizes a board of zoning appeals to attach conditions to
both special uses and variances. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-4 (1975) and ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 34, § 3154 (1975) do not grant zoning officials the power to place conditions on variances.
However, in O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 45, 105 N.E.2d 917 (1952) the court held
that a city has the unquestioned right to exercise its police power by imposing conditions, as
long as the conditions are reasonably related to the public health, morals, safety and welfare.
O'Brien, which involved zoning for a church, may only be peripheral authority, however, since
App.
there are special zoning rules for churches. See Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill.
3d 1089, 1094, 333 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1975).
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tion variances and special uses is implied by the courts, the power
to condition rezoning requests is sometimes implied. This assumes
that variances, special uses, and conditional rezoning are intended
to produce the same results." In jurisdictions which provide express
statutory authority to condition either a variance or a special use, a
persuasive argument can be advanced against implied authority to
conditionally rezone. If the power to impose conditions on variances
and special uses is expressly provided for by statute, it is clear that
the legislature considered conditional zoning techniques. The absence of express authority to place conditions on zoning amendments compels the conclusion that this procedure was intended to
3
be excluded from the amendment process. 1
Notwithstanding the lack of statutory authority to conditionally
rezone, an Illinois home rule municipality or county38 may have the
power to enact a conditional rezoning ordinance. The state zoning
enabling act 3 does not apply to a home rule municipality or
county. 0 Presumably, if the conditional home rule rezoning ordinance is constitutional, it will foreclose a challenge of ultra vires
action.
The majority of courts which have considered conditional rezoning have bypassed the statutory justification question. When confronted with conditions in a rezoning case, these courts have conveniently labelled the activity "contract zoning." Although contract
zoning has been the principal basis for invalidating conditional ordinances, other, less substantial criticisms have also been raised.
2.

Spot Zoning

Conditional rezoning has been objected to on the ground that it
constitutes spot zoning which destroys the uniformity that zoning
36. This assumption is incorrect. Special uses, variances, and conditional rezoning are
intended to serve different purposes. See text accompanying notes 58-66 infra.
37. See generally Strine, supra note 35.
38. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(a). A home rule unit may "exercise any power and perform any
function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare." Prior to the 1970
constitution, Dillon's Rule applied to all units of local government in Illinois. According to
the rule, local governments were deemed to have only those powers which were expressly

granted by the constitution or by statute. See J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPOaATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911). See generally Note, Sanitary Landfill Permits
in Illinois: State Preemption of Home Rule Zoning Powers, 8 LOY. CHI. L.J. 353 (1977).
39. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 et seq. (1975) and IL.. REv. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 3151-61
(1975).
40. Cain v. Am. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 26 Ill. App. 3d 574, 325 N.E.2d
799 (1975). See also City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 61 I1. 2d 483, 338 N.E.2d 19 (1975);
Johnny Bruce Co. v. City of Champaign, 24 I1. App. 3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (1974).
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is intended to create.' Spot zoning is a change in zoning applicable
only to a small area, which is incompatible with the comprehensive
land use plan for the community.2 Both the procedure and the
result of spot zoning are considered improper. Procedurally, the
practice of spot zoning is viewed with disfavor because the rezoning
marks a particular landowner for special treatment inconsistent
with the purposes of the pre-planned land controls. This criticism
focuses on the assumption that spot zoning unfairly discriminates
against those who have neither the political influence to obtain a
rezoning nor the financial resources to contest a zoning change. 3
Spot zoning is objectionable in substance because it undermines
the basic rationale of zoning:"
To have varying conditions and regulations on different parcels of
property in a district having similar uses is the very antithesis of
uniformity within a district. Restrictions which do not operate on
all alike cannot be justified under the statute or the police power.
If some parcels of land are zoned on the basis of variables that
could enter into private contracts, then the whole scheme and
objectives of community planning and zoning would collapse.,'
Spot zoning is detrimental only when the zoning change does not
conform to a comprehensive plan." Where the proposed use is consistent with the general policies of the plan, benefits the community, and is fair and reasonable, the requirement of conformity
is satisfied. 7
Absolute conformity is not mandatory 8 nor is spot zoning invalid
in every instance; validity is tested on a case-by-case basis. 9 Condi41. Plaintiffs in Goffinet relied heavily on this contention in the appellate court. Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Il1. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d
731 (1975).
42. Reskin v. City of Northlake, 55 IlI. App. 2d 184, 189, 204 N.E.2d 600, 603 (1965).
43. Id. at 189, 204 N.E.2d at 603.
44. Sections 2 and 3 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act provide that all regulations within a given district must be uniform, and that they must be made in accordance
with a comprehensive plan.
45. 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 74-13 (3d ed. 1972).
46. See generally Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. REv.
1154 (1955), where alternative approaches to the problem of conformity to the comprehensive
plan are discussed. Although there is no statutory requirement in Illinois for either uniformity
or conformity to a comprehensie plan, the courts have stated that regulations cannot be out
of harmony with comprehensive planning for the good of the community as a whole. See,
e.g.,Fifteen-Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City of Chicago, 15 Il. 2d 408, 155 N.E.2d
97 (1958); Duryea v. City of Rolling Meadows, 119 111.App. 2d 445, 256 N.E.2d 32 (1970).
47. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1975). See also
Note, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 303 (1959).
48. City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 111.84, 98, 149 N.E. 784, 789 (1925).
49. See Fifteen-Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City of Chicago, 15 Ill. 2d 408, 155
N.E.2d 97 (1958).
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tional rezoning, if objected to on the ground that it constitutes spot
zoning, should also be treated on a similar case-by-case basis. An
ordinance which satisfies the requirement of compatibility with the
basic plan should not be nullified on the basis of spot zoning objections alone.5 0
3. Reverter Clauses
Many conditional rezoning ordinances contain a reverter clause.
The reverter clause specifies that upon the property owner's failure
to fulfill certain conditions, the land will automatically revert to its
prior use classification." Conditional rezoning ordinances are further criticized because reverter clauses are often included. Some
courts suggest that the operation of the reverter amounts to a second
rezoning, without compliance with the statutory procedures for notice, hearing, and appeal of rezoning decisions. 2 One court adopted
this interpretation of reverter clauses, yet sustained the general validity of conditional rezoning." The court stated that regardless of
whether the reversion was automatic or enforced by a board of supervisors, the "proceedings on their face would characterize the
reversion ordinance as a forfeiture rather than a legislative decision
on land use. An ordinance so conceived is not a valid exercise of the
police power."54 According to the Illinois Supreme Court, however,
the inclusion of a reverter clause in a conditional rezoning ordinance
is not sufficient to invalidate the ordinance.15
4.

Improper Considerations

Another argument against conditional rezoning is that such ordinances are likely to result from undue influences on local legislators
and administrators. 6 Giving local zoning authorities broad discre50. A closely related criticism of conditional rezoning is that it eliminates the predictibility which zoning is designed to afford. The thrust of this argument is that all genuine
standards will be eliminated from the zoning ordinance if factors peculiar to each parcel of
land are considered. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
51. Section 5 of article I of the zoning amendment in Goffinet provided in part:
Upon removal of gasification facilities located on said land by Illinois NapGas
Company, its successors or assigns, said land shall revert to a zoning classification
of A-1 agricultural.
Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill.
2d 40, 48, 357 N.E.2d 442, 446 (1976).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-13-3, 11-13-13 (1975), and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 315358 (1975) provide procedural-rules in rezoning cases.
53. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
54. Id. at 420, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
55. See text accompanying notes 105-07 infra.
56. In Goffinet, the appellate court briefly addressed this argument. 30 III. App. 3d at
1096, 333 N.E.2d at 737 (1975). See also Trager, supra note 18. Trager suggests that this
contention underlies all of the criticisms of conditional rezoning, and the "unstated anxiety"
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tion to place conditions on a zoning amendment fosters corruption.
While there can be little doubt that the more leeway local authorities are given the greater the potential for abuse, the fact remains
that the potential for abuse in a conditional rezoning case is no
greater than in other areas where public officials enjoy wide discretion. Moreover, courts are not without standards to judge the propriety of a zoning authority's action. 7
Alternatives to ConditionalRezoning
In addition to rezoning amendments, there are at least two other
procedures used to alter the zoning classification of a tract of land.
A zoning authority can achieve results similar to conditional rezoning by granting variances and special uses. 8
In Illinois, municipalites and counties have express statutory authority to modify the zoning regulations applicable to specific tracts
under certain circumstances. A variance (historically known as a
''variation") is granted only when compliance with the ordinance
will cause "practical difficulties or particular hardship" to the
landowner 0 As an alternative to conditional rezoning, however, the
variance procedure is unsatisfactory:
The variation procedure as prescribed in the act is designed to
provide a flexible method for relaxing the rigid requirements of the
ordinance in cases of individual need. It is not designed to work
major changes in the zoning plan. Amendments by the legislative
body are available for that purpose.'
In the typical conditional rezoning case, the petitioner is seeking a
complete change in the use classification rather than relief from the
hardship of the existing ordinance. A rezoning petitioner might also
be unable to satisfy the "practical difficulty or particular hardship"
test. Also, the fact that the property will generate more profit under
a different use is insufficient to justify a variance. 2
of the courts in this regard may be one reason why the opinions on this subject provide so
little insight. Id. at 148.
57. See text accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
58. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERIcAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.20 (1st ed. 1968).
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.24, §§ 11-13-4, 11-13-11 (1975) and ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 34, § 3154
(1975).
60. In order to show the required hardship or difficulty three tests must be met: (1) the
property in question cannot yield a reasonable return if permitted to be used only under the
conditions allowed by the regulations in that zone; (2) the plight of the owner is due to unique
circumstances; and (3) the variation, if granted, will not alter the essential character of the
locality. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-4 (1975).
61. Sinclair Pipeline Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 373, 167 N.E.2d 406,
408 (1960).
62. Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931). See also River Forest State Bank
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As a rule, special use permits" are the most acceptable alternative
to conditional rezoning. A special use is the zoning authority's grant
to use property in a particular manner contrary to the zoning ordinance. Special uses are specifically listed in the text of the zoning
ordinance as an allowable departure from the particular use classification. 4 The standards for granting special use permits are established at the time the ordinance is enacted. To obtain a special use,
there must be a showing of substantial compliance with these standards.
Conditional rezoning and special uses are theoretically different
concepts. 5 A special use involves only one named use, whereas a
rezoning amendment permits a wide variety of uses in addition to
the particular use the applicant seeks. A rezoning amendment is a
change in the basic text and map of the zoning legislation, but a
special use involves no permanent change in the classification of the
property.
This theoretical distinction, however, breaks down in practice. A
zoning authority can impose any conditions on a special use which
it reasonably believes necessary to conform the use to the standards
established in the ordinance. 6 This factor makes a conditional rezoning ordinance virtually indistinguishable from a special use permit in certain circumstances. If the particular condition to a rezoning ordinance restricts the property to a single use, a special use
with conditions might accomplish the same result.
The Advantage of Conditional Rezoning
Conditional rezoning offers a distinct advantage over traditional
zoning methods. The use of conditions in the rezoning process provides greater flexibility in administering land use policy. 7 An applicant for a zoning change under the traditional scheme faces an allor-nothing situation. If the existing ordinance does not list the proposed use as a special use, the rezoning petition must be granted or
denied as presented. If the rezoning is granted, the applicant is not
restricted to the use which he proposed but can put the property to
any use permitted in the new zone classification. Since the zoning
authority cannot qualify the rezoning, the change of classification
& Trust Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Maywood, 34 111. App. 2d 412, 181 N.E.2d 1 (1962).
63. Municipalities may grant special uses under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1.1 (1975).
There is no comparable provision in the county zoning statute.
64. Int'l Harvester Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 43 Ill. App. 2d 440, 193 N.E.2d 856
(1963).
65. See generally Shapiro, supra note 6, at 281.
66. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1.1 (1975).
67. See generally Shapiro, supra note 6.
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may force unnecessary inconvenience or hardship on the adjacent
property owners. On the other hand, if the rezoning petition is rejected, the locality may be deprived of the economic or social benefits which the new use might otherwise provide. In addition, the
property owner is denied the opportunity to put the property to its
most profitable use. Rigid adherence to this absolute scheme elevates form over substance.
In jurisdictions approving conditional rezoning, zoning officials
have the means to balance the conflicting interests of the rezoning
applicant and the adjacent property owners. As a condition precedent to a rezoning, the zoning officials may require the landowner to
record a restrictive covenant limiting the use of the premises to
exclude those uses which are undesirable to neighboring property
owners. If this condition is satisfied the zoning authority may enact
an ordinance rezoning the property; however, it is not obligated to
do so. Conditioning the rezoning ordinance in this manner enables
the property owner to obtain the use change and protects the surrounding property from the potential adverse effects of the zoning
change. The power to conditionally rezone also stimulates the development of property which, under the traditional zoning scheme,
would remain undeveloped.
GOFFINET V. COUNTY OF CHRISTIAN

The FactualBackground
The vendor and option purchaser"s of certain land located in
Christian County, Illinois, petitioned the zoning board of appeals
for a change in zoning from agricultural (AG-1) to heavy industrial
(1-2). The rezoning was requested to permit Illinois NapGas Company, the option purchaser, to construct and operate a synthetic gas
production plant on the site. 9 The comprehensive plan for Christian
County states that the highest and best use of the subject tract,
located in a primarily agricultural area, is for agricultural purposes.70 However, the plan also stresses the need for more industrial
development to stimulate the local economy and to halt the emigration of the county's youth due to lack of jobs.7
68. The fee owner was selling 236 acres of farmland to Illinois NapGas Company. Illinois
NapGas is a wholly owned subsidiary of Trunkline which in turn is wholly owned by Panhandle Eastern Pipeline, a natural gas supplier. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40,
357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
69. Petitioners also sought a variance from the 1-2 height restrictions to construct several
radio towers and stacks. Id. at 46, 357 N.E.2d at 444-45.
70. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Il1. 2d at 45, 357 N.E.2d at 444.
71. The comprehensive plan states:
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The proposed plant would change liquid hydrocarbon into methane gas suitable for sale, distribution, and use. The liquid hydrocarbon would be obtained from a pipeline which originates in the Gulf
of Mexico and intersects a distribution pipeline one mile north of
the proposed site. A pumping station would remove the liquid from
the supply line and pump it into storage tanks. Upon completion of
the production process, synthetic gas would be pumped into the
distribution line. The site is highly desirable to Illinois NapGas for
several reasons. The tract is located at the confluence of the supply
line and the distribution line. The pumping station required for the
operation is already located on the land, and there is an ample
source of fresh water necessary to the production process."
The Zoning Board of Appeals of Christian County, however, recommended the county board deny Illinois NapGas' rezoning petition. Despite this recommendation, the county board amended the
zoning ordinance rezoning the property from AG-1 to 1-2. The
county board recognized both the community need for synthetic gas
energy and the economic stimulus to the county.73 The ordinance
It's recommended that promotion of new industry be more actively stepped up in
the county. All possible assistance should be given to hold and expand present
industries.
Supplemental Abstract of Record of Defendants-Appellees at 17, Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1975).
72. Panhandle Eastern retained an environmental consulting firm to study the plant's
potential impact on the environment. The results indicated that the plant would operate
within the ecological and environmental standards established by local, state and federal law.
Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 IIl. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
73. The Goffinet amending ordinance article I provided in pertinent part:
Section 6. That the best use of the land is for the uses of 1-2 heavy industrial
to permit the storage of naptha, petroleum products, and similar hydrocarbon
products, and the processing of the same into pipe line quality gas suitable for
distributor, utility, and industrial purposes.
Section 7. That permitting the foregoing 1-2 heavy industrial use of the premises
will not adversely affect the use of any of the neighboring land and will have no
detriment on the value of the neighboring and adjoining tracts of land.
Section 8. That there now exists in Christian County, Illinois, and the surrounding area a shortage of natural gas, substitute natural gas, and synthetic natural gas,
resulting in a gas crisis affecting residents of Christian County, Illinois.
Section 10. That the present and projected shortage of natural gas supplies
available for use in Christian County is and will require many persons in Christian
County, Illinois to find alternative sources of energy in lieu of natural gas, and the
alternative sources of energy are at this time more expensive and limited in availability.
Section 1I.
That the public health, safety and welfare of Christian County,
Illinois will be promoted by permitting the construction of the proposed facility by
Illinois NapGas Company in an effort to eliminate the present natural gas shortage.
Section 12. That the best interest of Christian County will be served by permitting the rezoning and variance requested in the Petition for the following additional
grounds:
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specified that the rezoning was conditioned on the use of the premises solely as a gas production facility."
Several adjacent property owners filed suit in the Circuit Court
of Christian County seeking a declaration that the amendment to
the zoning ordinance was void. 5 The complaint alleged, inter alia,
that the ordinance placed restrictions on the property not applicable
to other property in the same use classification. Hence, plaintiffs
contended the zoning action amounted to conditional rezoning and
spot zoning which rendered the ordinance invalid. The trial court
rejected these arguments and upheld the ordinance on the ground
that it was beneficial to the public health, welfare, and safety."
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District affirmed the trial court's order.77 The appellate court held that not
every conditional rezoning ordinance adopted by a legislative zoning
agency in Illinois is invalid per se.18 The ordinance in question was
designed for the protection of the public interest and was a reasonable exercise of the zoning power. The plaintiffs were granted leave
to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Two issues were presented
to the supreme court: (1) whether the rezoning ordinance was void
because it contained unauthorized restrictions amounting to condi(a) The proposed facility would tend to increase the supply of natural gas necessary for farm drying operations in Christian County, Illinois.
(b) The proposed facility will increase the assessed valuation in the county and
therefore, either (1) lower the overall tax rate on each tract of land in the county,
or (2) increase the tax revenue in the county.
(c) The proposed facility would increase the employment during the construction of the facility and during the maintenance and operation of the facility.
(d) That the proposed facility would tend to stimulate the economy of Christian
County, Illinois.
Section 13. That the rezoning of the 236 acres, more or less, from agricultural
use to heavy industrial use will not significantly affect farm production in Christian
County, Illinois, for the reason that there is now lying idle in Christian County,
Illinois, 49,198 acres of tillable farmland.
Id. at 46-47, 357 N.E.2d at 445.
74. Article I provided in relevant part:
Section 5. That the rezoning of said land to 1-2 heavy industrial shall be effective as of the date hereof and shall be subject to actual use of the premises for
gasification plant facilities as herein proposed. Upon removal of gasification facilities located upon said land by Illinois NapGas Company, its successors or assigns,
said land shall revert to a zoning classification of A-1 agricultural.
Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 48, 357 N.E.2d 442, 445 (1976).
75. Plaintiffs joined the County of Christian, the County Board, Illinois NapGas, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline and the fee owner as defendants. Plaintiffs also sought temporary and
permanent injunctions to prevent defendants from enforcing the ordinance. Abstract of Record at 2-5, Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1975).
76. Id. at 56.
77. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1975).
78. Id. at 1096, 333 N.E.2d at 736.
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tional rezoning, and (2) whether the rezoning ordinance constituted
illegal spot zoning."
The Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
The supreme court first considered appellants' contention that
the ordinance was invalid because it contained conditions. Appellants relied on two earlier supreme court decisions to support this
conclusion. In Treadway v. City of Rockford (Treadway I), ° involving an amending ordinance which rezoned property from residential
to local business, the court stated in dicta:
The ordinance in question is not, however, an unconditional
amendment rezoning the property from a residential to a local
business classification. It is conditional upon the owner's entering
into a covenant setting forth in some detail the nature of the improvements to be erected on the property. Such conditional
amendments have not fared well in the courts of other jurisdictions, and have frequently been invalidated either because they
introduce an element of contract which has no place in the legislative process or because they constitute an abrupt departure from
the comprehensive plan contemplated in zoning."
Adjacent property owners attacked the ordinance on the ground
that it was unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to the
subject property. The trial court upheld the zoning ordinance, but
imposed conditions on the rezoning in addition to those contained
in the ordinance. It was the trial court's conditions and not those
imposed by the zoning authority which lead to reversal in the supreme court."
The same ordinance was presented to the court again one year
later. In Treadway v. City of Rockford (Treadway II),13 the court
stated:
The rezoning ordinance involved in this appeal was passed by the
city council of the City of Rockford on June 26, 1962, and reclassifies the subject property from "A" residential to local business,
without the conditional limitations which were the basis of our
prior remandment 4
79. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Il. 2d 40, 48, 357 N.E.2d 442, 446 (1976).
80. 24 Il1. 2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (1962).
81. Id. at 496-97, 182 N.E.2d at 224.
82. 24 I1. 2d 488, 491, 182 N.E.2d 219, 221. The court misinterpreted the rule in Sinclair
Pipeline Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 111.2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 (1960). In Sinclair,the
supreme court held that in a zoning case a court could declare an ordinance valid or invalid
as applied to the specific use at issue in the litigation.
83. 28 11. 2d 370, 192 N.E.2d 351 (1963).
84. Id. at 371, 192 N.E.2d at 353.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

Although appellants in Goffinet argued that the language of
Treadway I and Treadway II clearly established the rule in Illinois
that conditional rezoning is invalid, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this analysis. The Goffinet court noted that the illegal conditions referred to in Treadway II were erroneously imposed by the
lower court and not by the zoning authority. Treadway I and Treadway H are not authority for invalidating conditional rezoning." In
addition, the supreme court distinguished several appellate court
decisions construing the Treadway cases.
In Hedrich v. Village of Niles,8 adjacent property owners filed
suit contesting the rezoning of certain property from residential to
limited manufacturing. The pleadings indicated that the rezoning
was granted solely because petitioner agreed to provide the village
with collateral benefits. 7 On procedural grounds the trial court refused to reach the question of whether these added considerations
invalidated the zoning ordinance.
On appeal, the issue considered was whether the court erred in
excluding evidence relating to the ancillary considerations for the
rezoning. Reversing the trial court on the procedural issue, 8 the
appellate court observed that the zoning amendment was conditioned on agreements and donations intended for the benefit of the
village. This "places [the village trustees] in the questionable position of bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had
no bearing on the merits of the requested amendment.""
As Goffinet correctly notes, conditional rezoning was not a proper
issue on appeal in Hedrich, and, therefore, the case is not authority
for a rule invalidating such a procedure. Hedrichdoes not absolutely
condemn the rezoning arrangement in the case, but rather suggests
by implication that conditions based on the merits of the request
85. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill.
2d 40, 48-50, 357 N.E.2d 442, 446-47 (1976).
86. 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969).
87. The rezoning petitioner, an industrial land developer, had agreed to give the village
park district a seven year option to buy a portion of the subject property. Petitioner would,
at an expense of $175,000, develop the property for use as a golf course, and fine a purchaser
for the revenue bonds issued by the village to finance any exercise of the village's option to
purchase. After 10 years, petitioner would donate $550,000 of the purchase price (more than
one-half) to the village. In addition, the petitioner agreed to give the village one acre of land
for a fire station, $75,000 for street improvements, and $10,000 for a traffic survey. Defendants
counsel stipulated that petitioner's agreement was conditioned on the zoning change. Id. at
72-73, 250 N.E.2d at 793.
88. The court stated: "We do find error, however, in the court's refusal to consider the
issue which surfaced during the trial. The issue must first be determined by the trial court
before we can consider it." Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 79, 250 N.E.2d
791, 796 (1969).
89. Id. at 78, 250 N.E.2d at 796.
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might be acceptable.1
In Cederberg v. City of Rockford," a landowner executed and
recorded a restrictive covenant limiting the use of his property as a
condition precedent to the enactment of a rezoning ordinance. 2 The
validity of the ordinance was contested by a subsequent purchaser
of the property. The trial court upheld the ordinance, but struck the
restrictive covenant as an improper attempt to control the use of the
land. On appeal, the parties stipulated that the restrictive covenant
was void. Thus, the only issue presented was whether the void restrictive covenant invalidated the rezoning ordinance. The appellate court held the ordinance invalid since "the City gave no consideration to the statutory standards of public health, safety, comfort,
morals and welfare."9 3 The Cederberg court cited Treadway I and
Hedrich for the proposition that zoning ordinances should not be the
subject of bargaining and contract.
The supreme court in Goffinet distinguished Cederberg on the
basis that the ordinance there was enacted solely because of the
restrictive covenant, without concern for the public interest. The
precise issue in Cederbergwas not whether conditional rezoning was
invalid, but whether improper conditions nullified the ordinance in
its entirety."4 Since the discussion of conditional rezoning was not
germane, Cederburg did not support appellants' position in
Goffinet.
The Goffinet court also distinguished Andres v. Village of
9 5 In Andres, nine conditions were imposed by an ordiFlossmoor.
nance which rezoned property from R-2 Single Family Residential
to R-6 Multiple Family Residential.96 The distinctive feature'of
Andres was the agreement between the landowner and village which
contained these conditions as essential terms. Without distinguish90. See also Shibata v. City of Naperville, 1 Ill. App. 3d 402, 273 N.E.2d 690 (1971). As
in Hedrich, the case was disposed of on procedural grounds. The court, however, stated in a
footnote that the legal status of "contract zoning" was unclear in Illinois. Treadway I and
Hedrich were cited for their disapproval of such ordinances.
91. 8 Ill. App. 3d 984, 291 N.E.2d 249 (1973).
92. The covenant provided that the property could only be used for one of the 44 permissible uses in the rezoned district. Id. at 985, 291 N.E.2d at 250.
93. Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 8 Ill. App. 3d 984, 988, 291 N.E.2d 249, 252 (1973).
94. Id.
95. 15 Ill. App. 3d 655, 304 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
96. The petitioner desired to construct 18 two-family ranch homes. Among the conditions
to the rezoning were provisions that: (1) the use be limited to single story attached two-family
dwellings; (2) general landscaping would be subject to village approval; (3) construction
commence within 90 days of the enactment of the rezoning; (4) the owner donate $1,000 per
building to the general village fund; and (5) the owner enter a contract with the village
containing all the restrictions and conditions. The contract was to be recorded and made a
covenant running with the land. Id. at 658, 304 N.E.2d at 705.
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ing between contract zoning and conditional rezoning the appellate
court held the ordinance invalid: "Flossmoor Ordinance No. 500 is
the very model of invalid conditional zoning, falling squarely within
the general policy considerations which strongly support the
Treadway rule invalidating such ad hoc conditional rezoning
amendments." 7 The court stated that Treadway I "constitutes a
succinct and perceptive analysis of the reasons why, absent general
statutory authorization and standards, the making of individualized
zoning deals by local municipalities, apart from the provisions they
are willing to adopt as general zoning regulations, is an invalid
abuse of the zoning power.""
Goffinet makes it clear that this reliance on Treadway I is misplaced. Although the general policy considerations in the Treadway
I dicta are acceptable, the case is not determinative on the issue of
conditional rezoning. Goffinet also distinguishes Andres on the
facts. The conditions imposed by the Village of Flossmoor introduced contract considerations which are not appropriate in the legislative context. 99
The supreme court concluded that conditional rezoning in Illinois
is not invalid per se. 00° The validity of a conditional ordinance
should be measured by those considerations set forth in LaSalie
National Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Cook.'' In making its
determination, a court should consider (1) the existing uses of
nearby property, (2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the zoning restrictions, (3) the extent to which the destruction of property values of plaintiff promotes the public health, welfare, and safety, (4) the relative gain to the public as compared to
the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner, (5) the
suitability of the property for the zoned purposes, and (6) the length
of time the property has been vacant as zoned.0 2
The ordinance in Goffinet substantially met these tests. The court
emphasized the unique characteristics of the property, and the fact
that the proposed plant would provide a needed source of energy. 03
There was no evidence that the value of adjacent property would
97. Andres v. Village of Flossmoor, 15 111. App. 3d 655, 657-58, 304 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1973).
98. Id. at 659, 304 N.E.2d at 703.
99. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 50-51, 357 N.E.2d 442, 447 (1976).
100. Id. at 51, 357 N.E.2d at 448.
101. 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957).
102. Id. at 46-47, 145 N.E.2d at 69.
103. A hospital, school, heating plant and several local businesses in Christian County
are "interruptable" gas customers. When the supply of gas is inadequate, these customers
are the first to have their gas supplies curtailed. Abstract of Record at 53, Goffinet v. County
of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1975).
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decline; to the contrary, the economy of the county would be substantially improved by the operation of the plant.
Appellants' second major argument, that the amendment constituted illegal spot zoning, was summarily treated. The court stated
that the rule applicable to spot zoning in Illinois was enunciated in
Fifteen-Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City of Chicago:
While it is true that inconsistent zoning of small parcels is not to
be encouraged, this does not mean that every reclassification of a
single tract is void ipso facto; rather, it must be determined
whether such change is in harmony with a comprehensive plan for
orderly utilization of property in the locality; and the size of the
rezoned tract or area is merely one factor to be considered. 0 4
The Goffinet court upheld the Christian County ordinance as consistent with the general policies of the comprehensive plan. Accordingly, it did not represent illegal spot zoning.
Appellants also challenged the reverter clause in the ordinance.,"5
The court agreed that the ordinance did not specify the means by
which the property would revert to agricultuural use if the condition
was not satisfied. However, since the rezoning would be governed by
the county and state zoning legislation, the ordinance need not specify the means for reversion. 06 If it is determined that the conditions
have not been met and the property reverts to its initial use, the
statute provides the aggrieved party with the necessary due process
safeguards to challenge the findings. 07 A reverter clause, therefore,
is not a sufficient ground for invalidating a conditional rezoning
ordinance.
APPROACHES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Other jurisdictions are not consistent in the resolution of the conditinal rezoning issue. In many jurisdictions, the courts have failed
to distinguish whether their rules of decision apply to contract zoning, conditional rezoning, or both. Those jurisdictions which have
condemned zoning with conditions have actually considered contract zoning rather than conditional rezoning.
104. 15 Ill. 2d 408, 418-19, 155 N.E.2d 97, 102 (1959).
105. See note 74 supra; text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
106. The Christian County Zoning Ordinance states that administration and enforcement
of the ordinance are to be "in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 34, Sec. 3151-3161,
of Illinois Revised Statutes." The statute provides for the appointment by the county of an
officer to enforce the zoning ordinance. The officer is given power to make all necessary
decisions relating to the enforcement of the ordinance. The court indicated that such officers'
duties would include the power to enforce special use permits and conditions to rezoning
ordinances. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Il1. 2d 40, 53, 357 N.E.2d 442, 449 (1976).
107. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 34, § 3156 (1975).
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The principal jurisdictions holding zoning with conditions invalid
are New Jersey,'"' Florida, 1" and Maryland." 0 The case law from
these jurisdictions is factually similar. In each case an express contractual arrangement between governmental unit and property
owner was a critical factor in the rezoning decision."' The rezoning
ordinances were struck down in every instance. The courts agree on
the basic reason for invalidating such ordinances. The primary consideration is that contracts are not proper in the zoning process since
a legislative body cannot bargain away the exercise of its police
power." 2 The Maryland Supreme Court went beyond the contract
zoning argument, however, and dealt directly with three other criticisms of zoning with conditions.
First, the court emphasized that there was neither express nor
implied statutory authority for the city zoning board to impose conditions." 3 Second, the court observed that an ordinance based on a
private agreement would adversely affect the basic zoning plan." 4
Finally, the court stressed that land use regulations should not be
based on evidence extrinsic to the zoning ordinance. If the bases for
rezoning were found in outside agreements, the zoning ordinance
would not provide adequate notice and predictibility to the pub5
lic."
Perhaps the key to reconciling the approach of these jurisdictions
with the decisions upholding conditional rezoning is provided by the
Florida Supreme Court in Hartnett v. Austin. "I The Hartnett court
notes that the policy underlying conditional rezoning is not to be
condemned, but that criticism should be directed to the means
108. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d
319 (1952).
109. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
110. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
111. In Houston Petroleum, the rezoning petitioner entered a written agreement with the
city in which the petitioner agreed to record restrictive covenants on the property relating to
open space and set back lines. In Baylis, the reclassification was subject to the execution of
an agreement between city and owner which restricted the use of the property, and in
Hartnett, the ordinance provided that its effectiveness was contingent on a contract between
the city and owner covering the requirements placed on the rezoning.
112. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 129, 87
A.2d 319, 323 (1952); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore,
219 Md. 164, 170, 148 A.2d 429, 432 (1959).
113. The court acknowledged that there might be authority to subject variances and
special uses to conditions, but the basis for that power was not present when a complete
change in the comprehensive plan was intended. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164,
167-68, 148 A.2d 429, 432 (1959).
114. This is essentially another way of phrasing the criticism that zoning with conditions
destroys uniformity. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
115. See note 50 supra.
116. 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
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employed to effectuate that policy." 7 The court maintained that if
properly handled, a conditional rezoning scheme might benefit the
entire community. What Hartnett seems to say, therefore, is that
the Florida, Maryland, and New Jersey courts were reacting against
the form chosen to impose the conditions, and not the substantive
validity of conditional rezoning. A comparison of these cases with
more recent decisions supports this position.
Presently, at least six jurisdictions have approved conditional rezoning in some form."' With two exceptions, I" conditional rezoning
has been held valid in cases in which there was no bilateral agreement between the governmental unit and the property owner. "
Again, the basic approach taken by courts in these jurisdictions is
similar. Since the cases did not involve contract zoning, the courts
directed their attention to the results of conditional rezoning and
not to the form in which the conditions were implemented.
The New York Court of Appeals in Church v. Town of Islip,11 was
the first court to adopt this analysis. The court found no illegality
where the town board made a zoning change conditional on the
property owner's recordation of deed restrictions. 2 2 The court recognized that legislation by contract is impermissible. However, the
court was concerned "with actualities, not phrases."' 23 In this case,
the ramifications of the proposed use on the community necessitated the conditions. The need to accommodate the increasing population of the county, and to mitigate adverse affects on adjacent
property were the "actualities" supporting the town board's action.
Since the practical result of the conditions benefitted the community in general, there was no justification to strike down the
117. Id. at 90.
118. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960); Sylvania Elec. Prod.
v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wisc. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120
N.W.2d 270 (1963); State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790
(1967); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App.2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
119. See note 128 infra.
120. See, e.g., Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960) (property
owner unilaterally imposed deed restrictions as condition to rezoning); Sylvania Elec. Prod.
v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962) (zoning board requested and petitioner recorded restrictions relating to building floor area, open space and limitations on use);
Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963); State ex rel. Zupancic v.
Schimenz, 46 Wisc. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970) (private parties executed contract restricting use of property for benefit of city).
121. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960).
122. The restrictions limited building location to a specific area of the property and
provided that a fence was to be constructed enclosing the area.
123. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683 (1960).
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rezoning ordinance. The case has been criticized for its brevity,'
but its pragmatic treatment of conditional rezoning has been followed in other jurisdictions.
If the reclassification conforms to the comprehensive plan and is
not the result of a contract, some courts will not object to the
method of imposing conditions. 25 These courts, which emphasize
compatability with the general policies of the comprehensive plan,
have broadened the scope of judicial inquiry in determining the
validity of conditional rezoning. Facts peculiar to the property, the
form of the rezoning petition, and the desirability of the proposed
use itself are important elements in this determination.121
Finally, an additional practical consideration has been raised by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In State ex rel. Zupancic v.
Schimenz, 7 the court noted that permitting private agreements to
condition a change in use gives a municipality flexibility in meeting
complex zoning problems. Faced with increasing demands for rezoning in rapidly changing areas, the zoning authority has the means
to tailor rezoning petitions to promote both the development of the
community and the general policies of the comprehensive plan.
Also, the court maintained that the validity of a conditional ordinance should be measured in the same manner as other zoning
decisions. The ordinance must further the public health, safety, and
welfare, and must not constitute illegal spot zoning.
The rules developed in other jurisdictions, therefore, are not irreconcilable. Even in those jurisdictions which uphold conditional
rezoning, an ordinance adopted pursuant to an express contract
between property owner and governing body is not valid. 2 What the
courts approving conditional rezoning recognize, however, is that
there are circumstances where the exaction of conditions does not
124. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW, LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 29.03
(1974).
125. Sylvania Elec. Prod. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 435, 183 N.E.2d 118, 122
(1962).
126. See, e.g., Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.E.2d 533 (1963); Sylvania
Elec. Prod. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 436, 183 N.E.2d 118, 123 (1962).
127. 46 WisC. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
128. But see State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967),
where the court suggests that even contract zoning may be valid. An amendment to the
zoning ordinance and a concomitant agreement involving the city would be void only if it was
shown that there was no valid reason for the reclassification and it had no relation to the
public health, safety and welfare. According to the court, contract zoning is improper only
when the city uses the agreement for bargaining and sale to the highest bidder or solely for
the benefit of private speculators. See also Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal.
App.2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969) and note 18 supra. These cases represent an extreme
position not followed by other courts.
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constitute a bargaining away of the zoning power. When these circumstances exist, rezoning with conditions is a realistic solution to
the problems presented by the requested change of use.
IMPACT OF GOFFINET

Goffinet marks the first time the Illinois Supreme Court has
squarely faced the issue of conditional rezoning. The determination
that conditional rezoning is not invalid provides local zoning officials with an alternative device for land use control. Conditional
rezoning will inject much needed flexibility into the land use
decision-making process.' 29 Local governments can more effectively
balance (1) the community's interest with the interests of the individual property owner, (2) economic necessity with social and aesthetic concerns, and (3) conformity to the comprehensive plan with
changing circumstances.
Goffinet follows the developing judicial trend in other jurisdictions in sustaining conditional rezoning. The decision focuses
greater attention on the merits of the proposed rezoning ordinance
than on its form. This approach is significant at two stages of the
rezoning process. At the local government level, the critical question
will be whether the proposed use and the conditions meet the needs
of the community. If the local government action is challenged,
courts must determine that the conditional rezoning ordinance is
improper in both substance and form before invalidating it. The
applicant for the use change, the adjacent property owners, and the
community stand to benefit from this approach.
The impact of Goffinet ultimately depends on the exercise of
discretion by local zoning authorities. The supreme court did not
provide explicit guidelines for determining when conditional rezoning is valid or invalid. It is obvious, however, that zoning officials
do not have the right to impose conditions in every situation. Conditions which are extraneous to the merits of the rezoning request
should still be improper in the rezoning process. If conditions are
imposed similar to those in Hedrich v. Village of Niles,3 0 and
Andres v. Village of Flossmoor,'3 ' conditional rezoning will be
stripped of its salutory character. In that situation, the rezoning
ordinance should be declared void.
The extent Goffinet contributes to land use control, therefore, will
be related to the ability of zoning officials to frame conditions con129.
130.
131.

See text accompanying note 67 supra.
112 Il. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969). See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
15 111. App. 3d 655, 304 N.E.2d 700 (1973). See text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
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sistent with the underlying purpose of conditional rezoning. At a
minimum, the conditions must relate to the proposed use and be
designed to accommodate conflicting interests. The specific problems which a new use will create must be identified. Once these
problems are isolated, conditions can be placed on the rezoning
proposal to minimize their effect. This kind of analysis will lead to
more considered and rational land use decisions.
CONCLUSION

There are valid distinctions between contract zoning and conditional rezoning. The rule announced by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Goffinet recognizes the different legal implications of these separate zoning devices. The court followed the trend of other jurisdictions and approached conditional rezoning in terms of its practical
advantages. However, the supreme court did not address the criticism that conditional rezoning is invalid for lack of statutory justification. It is plausible, therefore, that a reasoned argument based on
this contention might be successful.
Nevertheless, the validity of conditional rezoning ordinances after
Goffinet will be measured by the same standards applicable to other
zoning ordinances. An ordinance which substantially satisfies the
test outlined in La Salle National Bank & Trust Co. v. County of
Cook is not invalid because it contains conditions. Although the
court did not provide separate guidelines for determining the validity of particular conditions, it appears that conditions which promote the fundamental purpose of conditional rezoning are permissible. Conditional rezoning ordinances, enacted pursuant to these
requirements, will afford local government greater flexibility in
administering zoning policy and will lead to improved land use
development in Illinois.
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